

PFIAB WORLDWIDE EVALUATION OF THE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES BY WHICH OUR FOREIGN MISSIONS PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND FACILITIES (U)

With the recent discovery of further security problems in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and in other foreign missions, it is essential that we conduct a comprehensive survey of the security and counter-intelligence policies, procedures and practices that are currently being employed to protect classified information and facilities. The conduct of diplomacy and intelligence activities essential to our national security can only be carried out in a working environment that is protected from invasive activities on the part of hostile intelligence services. (U)

I therefore direct, consistent with the provisions of Executive Order 12537, that my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board immediately develop recommendations regarding the process and policies by which our foreign missions protect classified information and facilities. The Board should coordinate its activities with the designated elements of the National Security Council Staff. During this process, the Board shall be afforded the opportunity to review on a timely and cooperative basis the product of the interagency working group established by the NSPG of March 27, 1987, and provide me with such timely advice concerning the findings of these activities as the Board deems appropriate. (S)

This review should include recommendations relating to selection, training, management, discipline and command line relationships among personnel and organizations assigned to protect the security of our foreign missions. Of particular interest is an analysis and evaluation of the current relationship between the Defense and State Departments as it relates to the protection of classified information and facilities in our foreign missions. Recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the guard force, security procedures and technical security systems on a worldwide basis are required on an urgent basis. The Board should also conduct a

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
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
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review of all available information to determine the suitability of our new Embassy in Moscow as a secure environment in which to conduct classified activity, and provide me with their findings and recommendations within 90 days. (S)

I further direct that the heads of departments and agencies involved with counterintelligence or security in support of our worldwide foreign mission operations provide the Chairman of the PFIAB such prompt information and support as necessary to implement this directive. (S)

The Board should submit its initial report and recommendations to me by July 13, 1987. (U)





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